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The shareholder wealth maximization doctrine requires the public
corporation to pursue a single purpose to the exclusion of all others:
increase the wealth of shareholders by increasing the value of their shares,
within the confines of the law. 1 The doctrine prohibits the corporation
Levin, Mabie & Levin Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law and
Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA School of Law.
1 Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic
Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 717 (2002) (“[T]he predominant position on corporate
*

1

2

Forthcoming UC DAVIS LAW REVIEW 2023

[2022

from forgoing even a dime of shareholder wealth to benefit the
environment, charities, or the corporation’s other stakeholders. 2 Those
other stakeholders are the corporation’s customers, employees,
managers, creditors, suppliers, communities in which the corporations do
business, and the public. If shareholders can benefit from socially harmful
but legal action—such as burning of fossil fuels, moving jobs offshore,
price gouging on life-saving drugs, shifting liabilities to corporate shells,
or sourcing raw materials from human rights violators—the doctrine
requires that the corporation take those actions. As a result, the doctrine
is the principal legal barrier to the environmental, social and governance
(ESG) role of the public corporation. This Article will refer to both the
noun, “shareholder wealth maximization,” and the verb, “shareholder
wealth maximize,” as “SWM” to make it easier for readers to distinguish
those concepts from similar terms.
Some scholars argue that SWM is the law of Delaware, which would
make it the governing law for most U.S. public corporations. Even more
importantly, SWM is a norm embedded in the minds of many economists,
law professors, businesspeople, and the public.
The SWM doctrine is so extreme that few corporations espouse it.
Courts rarely enforce it. Instead, the business judgment rule presumes that
directors’ actions—gifts to the managers’ favorite charities, net-zero
greenhouse gas campaigns, corporate jets, CEO compensation of
hundreds of million dollars a year—are all for the purpose of maximizing
long-run profits. Except when managers announce their lack of intention
to SWM, 3 legal procedures prevent shareholders from rebutting the
social responsibility suggests that a corporation's social responsibility is to maximize shareholder
wealth within the confines of the law.”).
2 JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION (2004) (“The corporation . . . is compelled to cause harm
when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.”); Bernard Black & Reinier
Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L.
REV. 521, 527 (2002) (“In Van Gorkom, as in Revlon and its progeny, the board’s duty is
to maximize shareholder value without regard to the interests of other corporate constituencies
such as creditors or employees. . . . [L]ogic compels the conclusion that the board cannot pursue
these interests at the expense of long-term shareholder value.”); Paul Weitzel & Zachariah J.
Rodgers, Broad Shareholder Value and the Inevitable Role of Conscience, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS.
35, 45 (2015) (“A course of action maximizes shareholder wealth if and only if no other course
of action would have produced more shareholder wealth.”).
3 In the two leading cases, the managers did exactly that. E.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170
N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (Henry Ford’s “testimony creates the impression, also, that he thinks the
Ford Motor Company has made too much money, has had too large profits, and that, although
large profits might be still earned, a sharing of them with the public, by reducing the price of the
output of the company, ought to be undertaken.”); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16
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presumption, and the directors’ actions stand.
Although legally unenforceable, the doctrine is often regarded as the
law. Directors can cheat. But law- or norm-abiding directors must SWM.
Only cheaters can apply corporate assets for the benefit of anyone other
than the shareholders. Taking advantage of the doctrine’s
unenforceability, most directors do not maximize shareholder wealth. As
others before me have pointed out, SWM is a misleading description of
how the public corporation operates. 4
SWM persists due to a widely felt fear that SWM drives corporate
performance and its rejection might imperil the economy. This Article is
an effort to finally put the SWM doctrine to rest by examining the theory
on which it is built. That examination reveals the lack of any plausible
connection between corporate performance and the obligation to SWM.
Part I of this Article provides a quick review of the long-running
debate over the purpose of public corporations. Part II explains the state
of current SWM law. Parts III through VI present the arguments and
refutations for SWM from ownership, residual ownership, agency
implied contract, and shareholder monitoring theories. Part VII explains
the lack of reason to believe that exorcising SWM would adversely affect
corporate performance. Part VIII summarizes the arguments and
concludes that abandoning SWM would reduce corporate
externalizations and eliminate the hypocrisy of a policy that is neither
honored nor enforced.
I. THE BERLE-DODD DEBATE
For almost a century, scholars have debated whether the purpose of
the public company is SWM or service to the interests of all stakeholders.
The modern debate began with three essays published in the Harvard Law
Review in 1931 and 1932. In the first, Columbia Law Professor A.A.
Berle argued that “all powers granted to a corporation . . . are . . .
exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders” 5 and “[n]o
form of words inserted in a corporate charter can deny or defeat this
fundamental control” because that would “defeat the very object and

A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Jim and Craig did prove that they personally believe craigslist should
not be about the business of stockholder wealth maximization, now or in the future.”).
4 LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 8 (2012) (“[S]hareholder value ideology is
based on wishful thinking, not reality.”); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate
Managers Trustees? 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 1154-55 (1932) (describing managers as socially
responsible).
5 A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L REV. 1049, 1049 (1931).
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nature of the corporation itself.” 6 Harvard Law Professor Merrick Dodd
conceded that “the duty of the managers is to employ the funds of the
corporate institution which they manage solely for . . . maximum
stockholder profit.” 7 He argued, nevertheless, that “public opinion, which
ultimately makes law” was changing such that in the future “we may then
properly modify our ideas as to the nature of . . . the corporation and hence
as to the considerations which may properly influence the conduct of
those who direct its activities.” 8 Dodd continued,
A sense of social responsibility toward employees, consumers, and the
general public may thus come to be regarded as the appropriate attitude to
be adopted by those who are engaged in business, with the result that those
who own their own businesses and are free to do what they like may
increasingly adopt such an attitude.
[Regarding] the managers as representatives of the stockholding
interest only . . . means in practice that there are no human beings who are
in a position where they can lawfully accept for incorporated businesses
those social responsibilities which public opinion is coming to expect. 9

Berle responded that “you cannot abandon . . . the view that business
corporations exist for the sole purpose making profits for their
stockholders until such as you are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably
enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else.” 10
Since then, scholars have added hundreds of articles to the debate
along with numerous schemes of responsibilities to someone else. During
the 1980s and 1990s, academic opinion shifted in favor of SWM. 11 In
2001, Professors Henry Hansmann and Renier Kraakman declared “there
is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value.” 12 Before the
ink was dry on that epitaph, academic opinion had begun moving in the
opposite direction. Although many corporate law academics continue to
Id. at 1074.
Dodd, supra note 4, at 1161.
8 Id. at 1163.
9 Id. at 1162.
10 A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365, 1367 (1932).
11 John Martin et al., Shareholder Value Maximization—Is There a Role for Corporate Social
Responsibility? 21 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 110, 110 (2009) (“The 1990s can best be described as
the decade of shareholder supremacy, with one company trying to outdo the next in its allegiance
to shareholder value creation.”).
12 Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO.
L.J. 439, 439 (2001).
6
7
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endorse SWM, 13 most now reject it. 14 More importantly, the arguments
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation, Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615,
1616 (2005) (“The discretionary powers thus conferred on directors and officers, however, are to
be directed towards a single end; namely, the maximization of shareholder wealth.”); Sanjai
Bhagat & Glenn Hubbard, Rule of Law and Purpose of the Corporation, 30 CORP. GOV.: INT’L
REV. 10, 11 (2021) (“We conclude that the modern corporation should maximize shareholder
value, while conforming to the law of the land.”); Pamela E. Queen, Enlightened Shareholder
Maximization: Is this Strategy Achievable?, 127 J. BUS. ETHICS 683, 693 (2015) (“[S]hareholder
value maximization should be the preferred corporate goal.”); George A. Mocsary, Freedom of
Corporate Purpose, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1319, 1368 (2016) (“[S]hareholder wealth
maximization is and should be the default strategic purpose in general corporations.”); Roberta
Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 955 (1984) (“[Profit
maximization] is not simply the best, but it is the only operational decision rule that we currently
have.”).
14 Kent Greenfield, Reclaiming Corporate Law in A New Gilded Age, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 1, 23 (2008) (“Almost certainly, if senior managers were required to consider the interests
of the firm more broadly—to include the well-being of all investors, equity or non-equity—in
their decisionmaking calculus, the firm would be more successful in satisfying the social goal of
creating wealth, broadly defined.”); Oliver D. Hart & Luigi Zingales, The New Corporate
Governance (Univ. of Chi., Becker Friedman Inst. for Econ., Working Paper No. 2022-55, 2022),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=4094175 (“When externalities are important and at least some investors
are prosocial, we argue that shareholders will want companies to pursue shareholder welfare
maximization . . . not [SWM].”); Timothy L. Fort, The Corporation As Mediating Institution: An
Efficacious Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 173, 177 (“[This] Article argues that corporations ought to be operated for the
primary benefit of all internal constituents.”); William Savitt & Aneil Kovvali, On the Promise of
Stakeholder Governance: A Response to Bebchuk and Tallarita, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 1881, 1886
(2021) (“Stakeholder governance has emerged as the most appealing alternative to the failed
shareholder primacy model.”); George Shepherd, Not Just Profits: The Duty of Corporate Leaders
to the Public, Not Just Shareholders, 23 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 823, 845 (2021) (“[T]he government
should distribute [limited liability] to corporations only on the condition that corporations
compensate the government for the valuable resource by operating in the public interest.”).
Malcolm Rogge, Bringing Corporate Governance Down to Earth: From Culmination Outcomes
to Comprehensive Outcomes in Shareholder and Stakeholder Capitalism, 35 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 241, 299 (2021) (“[M]anagers . . . must not be constrained in their role by
the formalistic construct of ‘maximization.’”); David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose,
10 BERKLEY BUS. L.J. 181 (2013) (“I do not believe [shareholder primacy] is desirable. The
shareholder primacy norm is responsible for substantial suffering and political dysfunction in our
society.”). Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule,
Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405 (2013) (“Delaware law should not mandate a narrow
money-maximizing purpose.”); Barnali Choudhury, Aligning Corporate and Community
Interests: From Abominable to Symbiotic, 2014 BYU L. REV. 257 (2014) (advocating for an
13
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in favor of SWM all fail under close scrutiny.
Both sides in this debate agree that the objective is benefit to society
as a whole, not merely to benefit corporations or their shareholders. 15 As
Hansmann and Kraakman put it:
All thoughtful people believe that corporate enterprise should be
organized and operated to serve the interests of society as a whole, and that
the interests of shareholders deserve no greater weight in this social
calculus than do the interests of any other members of society. The point is
simply that now, as a consequence of both logic and experience, there is
convergence on a consensus that the best means to this end (that is, the
pursuit of aggregate social welfare) is to make corporate managers strongly
accountable to shareholder interests and, at least in direct terms, only to
those interests. 16

The debate is a definitional quagmire. SWM is best defined as a
corporation’s effort to maximize the wealth of the corporation’s
shareholders. 17 Wealth is “the value of all the assets of worth owned by
a person. . . . Wealth is determined by taking the total market value of all
approach that “seeks to balance wealth maximization norms against community interest
enhancement”); Jessica Chu, Filling a Nonexistent Gap: Benefit Corporations and the Myth of
Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 155 (2012). (“[C]orporations
actually need to be able to endorse multiple purposes, not just shareholder wealth maximization”).
15 Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 778 (1997) (“Thus when the firm selects
the monitoring level that maximizes its own profits it also maximizes social welfare.”); Robert J.
Rhee, Fiduciary Exemption for Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, and the
Hobson’s Choice During A National Crisis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 661, 727 (2010): (“The
distributive principle of shareholder primacy is not the end of corporate law, but is instead a
default setting because in most cases profit maximization nicely correlates to increased social
wealth.”); Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of
Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1497 (1993) (“When a company is
financially sound, profit maximization benefits all participants in the corporate venture
and promotes societal welfare.”); Frederick Tung, The New Death of Contract: Creeping
Corporate Fiduciary Duties for Creditors, 57 EMORY L.J. 809, 819 (2008) (“[M]anagers should
manage the firm with a view to maximizing shareholder value. This shareholder primacy norm
harnesses the zest for private wealth maximization to serve the broader goal of social wealth
maximization.”); Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Stakeholders,
21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 62 (1996) (“Maximizing the present value of the corporation’s earnings
stream maximizes the total value of the corporation and, thus, maximizes the corporation’s
contribution to social wealth.”).
16 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 12, at 441.
17 Weitzel & Rodgers, supra note 2, at 45 (“A course of action maximizes shareholder
wealth if and only if no other course of action would have produced more shareholder wealth.”).
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. . . assets owned, then subtracting all debts.” 18 Some scholars use
“shareholder value maximization”—or just “shareholder value” for
short—as a synonym for SWM. 19 Some consider “shareholder primacy”
to be synonymous with SWM 20 while others consider shareholder
primacy not necessarily to include SWM. 21
The debaters generally assume that the aggregate value of the
stockholders’ shares is equal to the net market value of the corporation’s
assets after deduction of the corporation’s debt. 22 It follows that any
increase in the value of the corporation’s assets proportionally increases
the value of its shares and the wealth of its shareholders. Because
undistributed profits increase the value of the corporation’s assets, some
scholars consider profit maximization to be the equivalent of SWM.23
Robert C. Kelly & Pete Rathburn, What is Wealth? Investopedia, July 10, 2022,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/wealth.asp#:~:text=Wealth%20measures%20the%20val
ue%20of,the%20accumulation%20of%20scarce%20resources.
19 STOUT, supra note 4, at 2-3 (referring to the arguments that corporations should maximize
shareholder wealth as the “shareholder value myth”); Andrew R. Roop, Stakeholder Unrest,
Denominational Theology, and Economic Veracity: Why the Shareholder Value Maximization
Norm Should Remain Unchanged, 45 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 195, 199 (2006) (referring to the
“shareholder value maximization debate”).
20 Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy,
31 J. CORP. L. 637, 637 (2006) (“The shareholder primacy norm defines the objective of the
corporation as maximization of shareholder wealth.”); David Min, Balancing the Governance of
Financial Institutions, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 743, 764 (2017) (“Many scholars use the term
‘shareholder primacy’ to refer to the norm or practice or legal requirement of prioritizing
shareholder wealth maximization over other business interests.”).
21 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) (Although often used interchangeably, the terms
“shareholder primacy” and “shareholder wealth maximization” express distinct concepts.”);
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, Will Corporations Deliver Value to All Stakeholders?,
75 VAND. L. REV. 1031, seriatim (2022) (classifying as “shareholder primacy” policies that do not
require SWM).
22 But see Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Shareholder
Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 673 (2006) (“Shareholder value is neither the equivalent of firm
value nor a reasonable proxy for firm value, particularly when applied to the agency context upon
which corporate law is focused.”). Michael Jensen employs an idiosyncratic definition of “value
maximization” that values the firm rather than the shares. Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization,
Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 12 BUS. ETHICS QUARTERLY 235, 236
(2002) (“[V]alue maximization states that managers should make all decisions so as to increase
the total long-run market value of the firm. Total value is the sum of the values of all financial
claims on the firm including equity, debt, preferred stock, and warrants.”).
23 ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 678 (1986) (“First, under appropriate
18
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“Enlightened value maximization” is the view that directors should take
the interests of all stakeholders into account in their decision making—to
the extent doing so does not reduce shareholder wealth. 24
II. THE LAW ARGUMENT
The argument from law is that corporate law requires SWM, and
corporate performance demonstrates SWM’s effectiveness. In fact, the
law is ambivalent about SWM. First, most states have rejected SWM.
Second, even in Delaware, the most pro-SWM jurisdiction, the law is
confused. Third, the business judgement rule renders any SWM mandate
that exists unenforceable, enabling managers to ignore it.
A. Most States Reject SWM
At least thirty-five states have adopted statutes that authorize
directors to consider the interests of constituencies other than
shareholders in the director’s decision making. 25 Those statutes are, to
varying degrees, inconsistent with the idea that directors have a duty to
maximize shareholder wealth. 26 Some specify that the directors’ duty is
conditions and definitions, different formulations of the thing to be maximized – ‘profits,’ “the
company’s net present value,’ ‘the market value of the company’s common shares,’ and
‘shareholder wealth’ - turn out to be equivalent to one another.”). Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law,
Profit Maximization, and the “Responsible” Shareholder, 10 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 31, 60–61
(2005) (“On one formulation of the stockholder profit maximization rule, management’s
responsibility is construed as an obligation to maximize the stock price.”); James J. Park, From
Managers to Markets: Valuation and Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 47 J. CORP. L. 435, 436,
n.1 (2022) (“It is challenging to precisely define the concept of shareholder wealth maximization.
A more abstract formulation is that a corporation maximizes shareholder wealth when it
maximizes the present value of its earnings.”).
24 Jensen, supra note 22, at 235 (“Enlightened value maximization . . . accepts maximization
of the long-run value of the firm as the criterion for making the requisite tradeoffs among its
stakeholders, and specifies long-term value maximization or value seeking as the firm’s
objective.”); id. at 236.
25 Mathew D. Cain et al., Do Takeover Laws Matter? Evidence from Five Decades of Hostile
Takeovers, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 464, 470 (2017) (table showing the date each state adopted its
statute).
26 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Corporate Governance, Tentative Draft
No. 1, Apr. 2022, at 27 [hereinafter Draft Restatement of Corporate Governance] (“These statutes
generally provide the board with explicit discretion to consider the interests of nonshareholder
stakeholders and vary as to the degree to which those interests may be elevated to the same level
as the interests of shareholders as ends of corporate governance.”).
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to act in the best interests of the corporation, without mentioning the
shareholders. 27 The split of authority negates the idea that SWM is the
essence of the corporation. To the contrary, the United States Supreme
Court recently stated that “[w]hile it is certainly true that a central
objective of for-profit corporations is to make money, modern corporate
law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense
of everything else, and many do not do so.” 28 Courts in some states have
stated in dicta that the corporation’s purpose is to maximize shareholder
wealth, 29 but no state legislature has imposed a duty to SWM. 30
B. Delaware Law Is Confused
With respect to public corporations, Delaware’s law is the most
important because most public corporations are incorporated there. 31
Under the internal affairs doctrine, the law of the state of incorporation is
generally assumed to determine whether SWM is required. 32
Scholars sometimes describe the law of Delaware and some other
states as requiring SWM. 33 Former Delaware Chief Justice Leo Strine has
Ohio Rev. Code § 1701.59(B) (“A director shall perform the director’s duties . . . in
a manner the director reasonably believes to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation . . . .”).
28 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 710–12 (2014) (internal citations
omitted); Jill E. Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Should Corporations Have A Purpose?, 99
TEX. L. REV. 1309, 1323, 1327 (2021) (“Hobby Lobby appears to stand for the proposition that a
corporation can have an alternative purpose from profit maximization.”).
29 Grenada Investments, Inc. v. DWG Corp., 823 F. Supp. 448, 459 (N.D. Ohio 1993)
(stating, without citing authority, that “the principle that a corporate officer’s overriding duty is
to maximize shareholder wealth remains intact”).
30 Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733,
738 (2005) (“None of the fifty states has a statute that imposes a duty to profit-maximize or that
makes profit-maximization the sole purpose of the corporation.”).
31 About 55% of public companies are incorporated in Delaware. Lynn M. LoPucki,
Corporate Charter Competition, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2101, 2129 (2018) (empirical finding). Courts
and scholars seem to assume that the law of the state of incorporation governs purpose under the
internal affairs doctrine, even though the effects of SWM are felt primarily outside the
corporation.
32 Courts and scholars seem to assume that the law of the state of incorporation governs
purpose under the internal affairs doctrine, even though the effects of SWM are felt primarily
outside the corporation. The unstated premise—that SWM addresses the relationship between
directors and shareholders—is questionable. SWM principally addresses the relationship between
the directors and other corporate stakeholders.
33 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 141 (2d ed. 2009) (“It is well-settled that
27 E.g.,
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written:
Delaware case law is clear that the board of directors of a for-profit
corporation chartered under the Delaware General Corporation Law
(DGCL) must, within the limits of its legal discretion, treat stockholder
welfare as the only end, considering other interests only to the extent that
doing so is rationally related to stockholder welfare. 34

The fiduciary duty of loyalty under Delaware law, however, is not to
the shareholders alone. The duty is to “the corporation and its
shareholders.” 35 That duty “mandates that directors maximize the value
of the corporation over the long-term for the benefit of the providers of
equity capital.” 36 [emphasis added] In a later case the Delaware Chancery
Court explained:
In the standard Delaware formulation, fiduciary duties run not only to
the corporation, but rather “to the corporation and its shareholders” The
conjunctive expression captures the foundational relationship in which
directors owe duties to the corporation for the ultimate benefit of the
entity’s residual claimants. It is, of course, accepted that a corporation may
take steps, such as giving charitable contributions or paying higher wages,
that do not maximize corporate profits currently. They may do so, however,
directors have a duty to maximize shareholder wealth.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Making Sense
of the Business Roundtable's Reversal on Corporate Purpose, 46 J. CORP. L. 285, 301 (2021)
(“[Delaware Chief Justice Strine and Delaware Chancellor William T. Allen] believed that
directors had a duty to maximize the long-run interests of shareholders.”); Arnoud W.A. Boot &
Jonathan R. Macey, Monitoring Corporate Performance: The Role of Objectivity, Proximity, and
Adaptability in Corporate Governance, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 356, 363 n.21 (2004) (citing
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Shareholder Rights By-Law: Doubts from Delaware, 5 CORP.
GOVERNANCE ADVISOR 9, 9 (1997)) (“[T]he business and affairs of a Delaware for profit, stock
corporation are to be managed so as to maximize the value of the investment of one group and
one group only, its stockholders.”).
34 Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is Not a Hobby: The Judicial Revival of Corporate Paternalism
and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J. CORP. L. 71, 107 (2015). See also eBay Domestic
Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“I cannot accept as valid . . . a corporate
policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value of a
for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.”); Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v.
ODN Holding Corp., 2017 WL 1437308 (Del. Ch. 2017) (“[T]he fiduciary relationship requires
that the directors . . . maximize the value of the corporation over the long-term for the benefit of
the providers of presumptively permanent equity capital.”).
35 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986)
(“[T]he directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its
shareholders.”).
36 In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 37 (Del. Ch. 2013).
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because such activities are rationalized as producing greater profits over
the long-term. Decisions of this nature benefit the corporation as a whole,
and by increasing the value of the corporation, the directors increase the
quantum of value available for the residual claimants. Nevertheless,
Delaware case law is clear that the board of directors of a for-profit
corporation must, within the limits of its legal discretion, treat stockholder
welfare as the only end, considering other interests only to the extent that
doing so is rationally related to stockholder welfare.” 37

Professor Christopher Bruner argues that this duty “‘to the
corporation and its stockholders” reflects deep-seated ambivalence
regarding the degree to which shareholders’ interests ought to dominate
corporate decision-making.” 38 Reading that language the same way,
Professor Andrew Gold argues that that “because the interests of
shareholders and the interests of the corporation will sometimes conflict,
this amounts to an indeterminate standard. 39 Professor David Yosifon
responds that no conflict between the interests of the corporation and its
shareholders is possible, but he makes no effort to prove that. 40 Like
Yosifon, I read the court’s language as an assertion that no conflict is
possible—the interests of the corporation are identical to the interests of
the shareholders. In the official view, profit maximization maximizes the
interests of the corporation and its shareholders, making conflicts
between them impossible.
In reality, conflicts exist. Those conflicts are discussed in Part III.B.1,
below. For now, the point is that Delaware’s use of the phrase “the
corporation and its shareholders” and its insistence that maximizing the
value of the corporation maximizes shareholder value leaves Delaware’s
law confusing.
As others before me have noted, 41 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
and other Delaware cases authorize directors to consider “the impact [of
Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., No. CV 12108-VCL, 2017 WL 1437308,
at *17 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017), as corrected (Apr. 24, 2017) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
37

Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in A Time of Crisis, 36 J.
CORP. L. 309, 325 (2011)
38

39

Andrew S. Gold, Theories of the Firm and Judicial Uncertainty, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
1087, 1097 (2012).
40 Yosifon, supra note 14, at 209 (refuting Andrew Gold’s assertion that “the interests of the
shareholders and the interests of the corporation will sometimes conflict”).
41 Fisch, supra note 20, at 651 (“[E]ven in the takeover context, so long as the company has
not entered the Revlon mode, Delaware law permits directors to consider the interests of
“creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally.”); STOUT, supra
note 4, at 30-31 (“[S]ome [Delaware] cases explicitly state that directors can look beyond
shareholder wealth in deciding what is best for ‘the corporation.’”
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a transaction] on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors,
customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally).” 42
Unocal is important because the principal wealth-maximization cases are
from lower courts. Perhaps in recognition of the dearth of authority in
support of a SWM obligation, scholars often refer to SWM as a “norm.” 43
C. SWM Law Is Unenforceable
Courts that have imposed a duty to SWM do not enforce it, 44 except
in the rare cases in which managers volunteer that they are not
maximizing shareholder wealth. 45 Scholars widely acknowledge the
unenforceability of the SWM. 46 The result is that directors can take
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Its Implementation Under
Corporate Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 391 (2014) (“Shareholder wealth maximization is a norm
of corporate governance that encourages a firm’s board of directors to implement all major
decisions such as compensation policy, new investments, dividend policy, strategic direction, and
corporate strategy with only the interests of shareholders in mind.”); Gordon Smith, The
Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277 (1998); JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 32-33 (2008) (“Corporations are almost
universally conceived as economic entities that strive to maximize value for shareholders.”).
44 STOUT, supra note 4, at 25. (“There is no solid legal support for the claim that directors
and executives in U.S. public corporations have an enforceable legal duty to maximize
shareholder wealth. The idea is a fable.”).
45 Supra note 3 and accompanying text.
46 Dalia T. Mitchell, From Dodge to eBay: The Elusive Corporate Purpose, 13 VA. L. & BUS.
REV. 155, 210 (2019) (“Once the courts have begun to examine the corporation’s purpose as an
aspect of directors’ and managers’ fiduciary obligations, the presumption of the business
judgment rule has guaranteed that the shareholders would not be able to force directors to fulfill
the goal of wealth maximization.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in
Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 778 (2006) (“While the law clearly establishes
shareholder wealth maximization as one of the default contractual rights of shareholders, the
business judgment rule effectively precludes courts from reviewing corporate decisions that
allegedly further interests other than that of shareholder wealth maximization.”); Jonathan R.
Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177,
180–81 (2008) (“[I]it simply is not possible or practical for courts to discern ex post when a
company is maximizing value for shareholders and when the officers and directors are only
pretending to do so.”); id. at 181 (“The problem is not the lack of clarity of the rule. The problem
is lack of enforceability.”); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 256 (1999) (“[T]he ‘business judgment rule’ . . . insulates
directors from most claims of breach of the duty of care, even when they deliberately sacrifice
shareholders’ interests to serve other constituencies . . .”).
42
43
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actions without a SWM intent, and not have to implausibly assert that
they have one.
SWM is probably just a default rule from which directors and
shareholder can opt out. 47 DGCL § 102(b)(1) provides that “the
certificate of incorporation may contain . . . [a]ny provision for the
management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the
corporation . . . if such provisions are not contrary to the laws of this
State.” If a certificate provision is challenged, “the court must determine,
based on a careful, context-specific review . . . whether a particular
certificate provision contravenes Delaware public policy, i.e., our law,
whether it be in the form of statutory or common law.” 48 That is, all
Delaware corporate law rules are merely default rules unless they express
a public policy. It cannot be the public policy of Delaware that
corporations cannot seek both profit and public benefit pursuant to a
certificate provision, because Subchapter XV of the Delaware General
Corporation Law allows corporations to do precisely that by electing
“benefit” status. 49 Nor can it be the public policy of Delaware that
corporations can do so only by becoming public benefit corporations.
Delaware’s doctrine of independent legal significance provides that
“action taken under one section of [the Delaware Corporation Law] is
legally independent, and its validity is not dependent upon, nor to be
tested by the requirements of other unrelated sections under which the
same final result might be attained by different means.” 50 To put it
another way, public policies do not vary based on which section of the
Justin Blount & Patricia Nunley, Social Enterprise, Corporate Objectives, and the
Corporate Governance Narrative, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 201, 242 n.192 (2015) (“While the
shareholder wealth maximization language of eBay Domestic Holdings is quite strong, nothing in
the case expressly rejects the contractarian argument that this objective is still only a default
position that can be expressly modified by the parties.”); Fisch & Solomon, supra note 28, at 1333
(“We believe, however, that corporations can voluntarily commit in their charters to prioritize
stakeholder or societal interests and that such commitments would be legally enforceable.”). Joan
MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Statutes, Decisional
Law, and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939, 972 (2017) (“The Delaware common
law that has established shareholder primacy as the default governance rule for business
corporations neither states nor implies any public policy indicating that the rule should be
unalterable by charter provision.”).
48 Jones Apparel Grp., Inc. v. Maxwell Shoe Co., Inc, 883 A2d 837, 848 (Del. Ch. 2004).
49 But see David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public Benefit
Corporation Trivial?, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461, 479 (2017) (“[S]tate law arguably does not permit
corporate organic documents to redefine the directors’ fiduciary duties. In general, a charter
amendment may not derogate from common law rules if doing so conflicts with some settled
public policy.”).
50 Rothschild Int’l Corp. v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 474 A.2d 133, 136 (Del. 1984).
47
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Delaware Corporation Law is invoked.
The business judgment rule makes it difficult for the default-rule issue
to arise. The Draft ALI Restatement takes the position that “whether and
to what extent corporation[s] may opt out of the economic objective by
adopting a provision in its certificate of incorporation” is “an open
question.” 51 Most scholars adhere to that wobbly view. 52
III. THE PROPERTY ARGUMENT
The property-based arguments for SWM each have two steps. At the
first step, the argument is that shareholders own the corporation or are the
corporation’s residual owners. At the second step, the argument is that
status entitles the shareholders to wealth maximization. The two statuses
and their resulting entitlements are discussed separately.
A. Ownership
The first step in the ownership argument is that the shareholders own
“the corporation.” The law is clear that the shareholders own their shares
and the corporation owns its property. The dispute is about who owns
“the corporation.” The arguments are abstract because the disputants do
not say what they mean by “the corporation” in this context.
1. Shareholders Do Not Own the Corporation
Most scholars think the shareholders do not own the corporation. 53
Draft Restatement of Corporate Governance, supra note 26, at 37.
Yosifon, supra note 49, at 479 (“In light of the well-settled shareholder wealth
maximization policy, nonmonetary factors charter amendments therefore appear vulnerable.”);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971,
985 (1992) (“[I]t is uncertain that courts would enforce a charter term opting out of shareholder
wealth maximization.”).
53 Richard A. Booth, Who Owns A Corporation and Who Cares?, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147,
150 (2001) (“So how good is the stockholder ownership theory as a theory? Not very. It does not
describe the law very well, nor does it do a very good job as a normative matter.”); Julian
Velasco, Shareholder Ownership and Primacy, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 899 (2010) (“[T] here seems
to be substantial agreement among legal scholars and others in the academy that shareholders do
not own corporations”); e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law,
26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 396 (1983) (“Shareholders are no more the ‘owners’ of the firm than are
bondholders, other creditors, and employees (including managers) who devote specialized
resources to the enterprise ....”); John R. Boatright, What’s Wrong—and What’s Right—with
51
52
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They reach that conclusion by essentially three paths. First, contractarians
regard the corporation as a nexus of contracts in which the firm is “an
aggregate of various inputs acting together to produce goods or
services.” 54 “[T]he nexus of contracts approach rejects the idea that
shareholders hold property interests in the corporation, or that there are
property interests in the corporation.” 55 The shareholders are merely
capital suppliers, not owners. 56
That prominent scholars choose to regard the corporation as a thing
that cannot be owned, does not make it so. At the nexus of contracts is a
business—a thing—that consists of both people and property. 57 One can,
with some mental effort, regard the factory, machinery, and inventory as
resources provided by shareholders and creditors against the labor
provided by managers and employees under imaginary contracts, and
therefore not the property of the corporation. But in legal reality, the
factory, machinery, and inventory are the corporation’s property. 58 Real,
Stakeholder Management, 21 J. PRIVATE ENTER. 106, 114 (2006) (“Shareholders do not ‘own’
General Motors in the same way that a person owns a car or a house. Rather, shareholders have a
certain bundle of rights that includes the right of control and the right to the profits of a firm.”);
Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders
the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 26 (1991)
([S]hareholders do not “own” the modern, publicly held firm in any meaningful sense.”).
54 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 27 (2002).
55 Robert Anderson IV, A Property Theory of Corporate Law, 2020 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1,
19 (2020); Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A
Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423, 1427 (1993) (“[O]wnership is not a
meaningful concept in nexus of contracts theory. Someone owns each input, but no one owns the
totality.”).
56 Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 574 (“[T]he board of directors hires capital, not vice-versa.”);
Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980)
(“Dispelling the tenacious notion that a firm is owned by its security holders is important because
it is a first step toward understanding that control over a firm’s decisions is not necessarily the
province of security holders.”); Steven H. Kropp, Corporate Governance, Executive
Compensation, Corporate Performance, and Worker Rights in Bankruptcy: Some Lessons from
Game Theory, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 9 (2007) (“Under this nexus of contracts approach, or
contractarian model, shareholders are regarded not as owners but rather as suppliers of a particular
form of capital: equity.”).
57 But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Who Owns the Corporation?, professorbainbridge.com
(Jan. 13, 2006), https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2006/01/whoowns-the-corporation.html (“[F]irms aren’t things, they are simply a group of people for whom
the law has provided an off-the- rack relationship we call the corporation. There simply is nothing
there that can be owned.”).
58 STOUT, supra note 4, at 59 (“Corporations are real, at least in the legal sense. It is
shareholders that are fictional.”).
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not imaginary, contracts exist. Under those contracts, the shareholders
and creditors do not contract with the managers and employees; the
persons in all four groups contract with the corporation. 59
Second, some scholars argue that under options theory, creditors and
shareholders have equally valid claims to corporate ownership. 60 That
argument is wrong because the equality is only financial. The
shareholders’ ownership claim is stronger than the creditors’ in all other
respects. For example, shareholders have the right to voting control and
to the residual upon dissolution; creditors do not. Shareholders can pay
the creditors and own the entire value of the corporation. But creditors
cannot pay the shareholders and own the entire value of the corporation.
Third, Professor Lynn Stout and two other scholars argue that the
corporation owns itself. 61 In this conception, corporations “enter into
contracts with shareholders exactly as they contract with debtholders,
employees, and suppliers.” 62 None of the three scholars explained how
they reached that conclusion, but I suggest an explanation in the next
section.

59

See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 559-60 (explaining that the board of directors is
the nexus of contracts).
60 Theresa A. Gabaldon, Like a Fish Needs a Bicycle: Public Corporations and Their
Shareholders, 65 MD. L. REV. 538, 542 (2006) (“According to [options] theory, once a firm has
issued debt, debtholders and holders of equity both share contingent control and bear residual risk.
Thus, it might be said either that the debtholders “own” the firm and have sold a call option to the
shareholders or that the shareholders “own” the firm and have bought a put option from the
debtholders.”); Simone M. Sepe, Directors’ Duty to Creditors and the Debt Contract, 1 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 553 (2007) (“[T]he relationship between debtholders and shareholders can be
recharacterized as one in which the former “own” the right to the unlevered firm’s cash flow”);
Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
1189, 1192 (2002) (“[O]nce a firm has issued debt (as almost all firms do), it makes just as much
sense to say that the debtholders “own” the right to the corporation’s cash flow
but have sold a call option to the shareholder, as it does to say that the shareholder “owns” the
right to the corporation’s cash flow but has bought a put option from the debtholders.”).
61 STOUT, supra note 4, at 37 (“Corporations are independent legal entities that own
themselves.”). David Ciepley, The Corporation Is Always Already Government-Supported, and
So Is Bankruptcy, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 349, 351 (2013) (“The corporation owns itself.”);
Daniel P. Schley, CFA, Is Owning Stock an Abnormally Dangerous Activity? Shareholder
Limited Liability in Tort, 24 CHAP. L. REV. 55, 66 (2020) (“Because a corporation owns itself and
is its own principal, it will be vicariously liable for its agents’ actions in tort.”).
62 STOUT, supra note 4, at 37 (“Corporations are independent legal entities that own
themselves.”); id. at 38 (“Corporations own themselves and enter into contracts with shareholders
exactly as they contract with debtholders, employees, and suppliers.”).
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2. Shareholders Do Own the Corporation
A smaller group of scholars think the shareholders do own the
corporation. 63 They reach that result on three theories. First, ownership is
a social convention, and the prevailing convention—in and out of law—
is to speak of the shareholders as owning corporations. The second is that
shareholder rights—such as voting rights—constitute ownership of the
corporation. 64 The third is that the shareholders are the beneficial owners
of the corporation’s property. 65
Professor Melvin Eisenberg wrote that, “what constitutes property is
to a significant extent a matter of social convention.” 66 Velasco has
shown that social convention regards shareholders as the owners of the
corporation. 67 Businesspeople, lawyers, judges, and economists speak of
shareholders as the owners of corporations. 68 That includes Delaware and

Eisenberg, supra note 66, at 825 (“On balance, however, the claim [that shareholders do
not own the corporation] is unpersuasive.”); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing
the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 905 (1991)
(“That shareholders ”own” the corporation is the outcome of economic analysis of corporate
governance, not its premise.”); Tom C.W. Lin, Ceos and Presidents, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1351,
1370 (2014) (“Shareholders own the corporation.”); Velasco, supra note 53, at 897 (“According
to the traditional view, the shareholders own the corporation.”).
64 Anderson, supra note 55, at 8 ([T]he property interests in the corporation are the residual
governance rights that arise in the common stock directly from the relevant corporation statute-especially (but not uniquely) the plenary and residual voting rights.”).
65 E.g., TONY HONORÉ, MAKING LAW BLIND: ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 161-92
(1987) (putting trusts and “incorporated companies” in the same class). That is, shareholders
occupy the position in corporations analogous to the position beneficiaries occupy in trusts.
66 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and
the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 826 (1999).
67 Velasco, supra note 53, seriatim.
68 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970 (“[T]he key point is that, in his capacity as a corporate executive, the
manager is the agent of the individuals who own the corporation.”); G. Mitu Gulati et
al., Connected Contracts, 47 UCLA L. REV. 887, 907 (2000) (“[C]orporate law conceives
that equity is the owner.”); Arthur Levitt Jr., How to Boost Shareholder Democracy, WALL ST. J.,
July 1, 2008, at A17 (“The principle that shareholders own the companies in which they invest—
and are the ultimate bosses of those running them—is central to modern capitalism.”); Oliver
Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1773
(1989) (“Although owners (shareholders) typically retain some control rights, such as the right to
replace the board of directors, in practice they delegate many others to management, at least on a
day-to-day basis.”).
63
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other state case law, 69 and the definition of “share” in the Model Business
Corporation Act. 70
The second path to the conclusion that shareholders do own the
corporation applies the definition of property. The definition that is
currently most influential was proposed by Professor Tony Honoré in his
famous essay “Ownership.” 71 That essay identified the eleven “standard
incidents of ownership: that is, those legal rights, duties and other
incidents which apply, in the ordinary case, to the person who has the
greatest interest in a thing admitted by a mature legal system.” 72 The
eleven incidents are (1) the right to possess, (2) the right to use, (3) the
right to manage, (4) the right to income, (5) the right to the capital (which
includes the right to consume, waste, or destroy it), (6) the right to remain
an owner, (7) the right to bequeath it, (8) the absence of a term, (9) the
duty to prevent the thing from harming others, (10) liability to execution,
and (11) residuary character.
Shareholders lack seven of these eleven incidents (64%), including
the most important ones. They cannot take possession of the property or
use it. 73 They cannot manage it. 74 They have no right to the income unless
and until the directors declare a dividend. One might think of the income
as in the corporation to be distributed to the shareholders upon dissolution
if not sooner. But dissolutions of public companies are rare; most are
69

N. Am. Cath. Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101 (Del.

2007).
When a solvent corporation is navigating in the zone of insolvency, the focus for
Delaware directors does not change: directors must continue to discharge their
fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders by exercising their
business judgment in the best interests of the corporation for the benefit of its
shareholder owners.
Id.; Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (“The board of directors has the legal
responsibility to manage the business of a corporation for the benefit of its shareholder owners.”);
Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1124 (Del. Ch. 1990) (“[T]he prospect of losing a
validly conducted shareholder vote cannot, in my opinion, constitute a legitimate threat to a
corporate interest, at least if one accepts the traditional model of the nature of the corporation that
sees shareholders as “owners.”).
70 MBCA § 1.40.
71 HONORÉ, supra note 65, at 161-92 (1987).
72 Id. at 161.
73 Anderson, supra note 55, at 24 (“Shareholders typically lack the right to use corporation
property, at least without authorization.”).
74 Id. at 24 (“[S]hareholders] generally lack the right qua shareholders to manage, at least
directly, especially when compared to the management rights of the board of directors. DGCL
§ 141(a).
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liquidated while insolvent with all or substantially all the distributions
going to creditors. 75 Shareholders can neither consume, waste, nor
destroy the property. Controlling shareholders have the right to remain
owners, but non-controlling shareholders can be cashed out over their
objection through merger. 76 Shareholders have no duty to prevent the
property from injuring third parties. Thus, on a literal reading of the
incidents, the shareholders’ claim to ownership is weak.
Honoré, however, regards the corporation as an example of “split
ownership,” 77 meaning that the corporate property is split into two
ownership interests: one held by the corporation and the other held by the
shareholders. 78 The shareholders’ interest is in part legal, for example,
the right to vote, and in part beneficial, the right to income and capital
upon dissolution.
Viewing Honoré’s incidents in this manner, Professor Robert
Anderson concludes that “shareholders do have the strongest claim of any
claimant to the right to the income of the firm, the right to capital, the
right to security, the right to transmissibility, the right to absence of
term, and the incident of residuarity.” 79 Eisenberg seems to agree. 80
Anderson also concludes that “shareholders as a whole do have all
[eleven incidents], at least indirectly” 81 because they have the right to
See, e.g., Andrew A. Wood, The Decline of Unsecured Creditor and Shareholder
Recoveries in Large Public Company Bankruptcies, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 429 (2011) (finding
shareholders received no recoveries or nominal recoveries in 90% of large, public company
bankruptcies in 2009-10).
76 LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ANDREW VERSTEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH
228 (2021) (“Stock is property, and the person who wants to buy it ordinarily must negotiate with
its owner. In mergers, however, shareholders who do not want to sell their shares may be forced
to do so.”); Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (upholding a cash-out
merger).
77 HONORÉ, supra note 65, at 188 (“[S]plitting may serve the purpose of specialization, by
separating management from the enjoyment of income and/or right to dispose of capital. . . . In
this . . . class fall . . . incorporated companies.”).
78 Id. at 187.
79 Anderson, supra note 55, at 24.
80 Eisenberg, supra note 68, at 825.
75

As A. M. Honoré has pointed out, one way to determine the proper
characterization of an interest is by comparing the incidents of the interest with
the standard incidents of ownership, such as the rights to possess, use, and
manage, and the rights to income and to capital. From this perspective, the body
of shareholders appears to own the corporation.
Id.
81

Anderson, supra note 55, at 25
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dissolve the corporation and “take hold of and use corporate property for
any purpose.” 82
Anderson and Eisenberg overstate their cases. Ownership of the
corporate assets are split between the corporation and the shareholders.
But the corporation’s claim is stronger than the shareholders’ claim. Only
the corporation has possession, the right to use the assets, the right to
manage, and the right to the corporation’s income. Even the shareholders
acting unanimously cannot exercise these rights. 83 The shareholders
might be able to remove the directors and elect their replacements. But
doing so gives the shareholders none of these incidents. They still cannot
take possession of the assets, use them, manage the corporation’s assets,
or take its income. By dissolving the corporation, the shareholders can
become the owners of its assets. But that does not make them the owners
prior to dissolution. The corporation owns its assets until the corporation
dissolves and the shareholders own the assets after dissolution.
Honoré recommends that “if the rules of a legal system demand an
answer [to which of split owners should be considered the owner] it must
be sought in positive law, in the comparative strength of competing
analogies.” 84 I suggest that the closest analogy to the shareholders’
relationship with the corporate assets is that of an option holder to the
optioned property. By exercising its option—dissolving the
corporation—the option holder can become the owner, but until exercise,
the option holder is not the owner. 85 While the option remains
unexercised, the option holder may consider itself enriched by increases
in the property’s value, but that consideration is warranted only if the
82

Id.

[I]n California and New York a majority of the shareholders can dissolve the
corporation without the board’s consent. Even Delaware allows dissolution
without the board, though it requires a unanimous shareholder vote. Thus,
shareholders in these states have the right to take hold of and use corporate
property for any purpose, though that right may only be exercised collectively
and indirectly. The MBCA has a different rule, requiring the concurrence of the
board and shareholders to dissolve, but shareholders can always remove
directors who disagree with their plan.
Id.
For example, by delivering a signed consent to the corporation, shareholders can take only
those actions that shareholders could take at a shareholder meeting. DGCL § 228(a).
84 HONORÉ, supra note 65, at 164.
85 Gregory G. Gosfield, A Primer on Real Estate Options, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 129,
138–39 (2000) (“[T]raditionally (though not uniformly), states have not considered options as
interests in real estate, but as general intangibles . . . Of course, after exercising the option,
the option holder also has all of the rights of an equitable owner of title.”).
83
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increases remain part of the property at the time of exercise—that is, the
time of dissolution.
The case for shareholder ownership is strongest regarding one-person
corporations. An individual submits documents and fees to the Secretary
of State, receives a corporate charter, and transfers the individual’s
business to the corporation. It might seem obvious that the individual, in
his or her capacity as a shareholder, owns the corporation. 86 In presenting
his case against SWM, Dodd began by conceding this point: After
incorporation, he wrote, the “business is still a private enterprise existing
for the profit of its owners, who are now the stockholders.” 87
But even in the one-person corporation case, ownership is far from
clear. The individual as shareholder does not have the right to order the
corporation, its directors, or its employees what to do. The individual as
shareholder must elect him or herself director and, in that capacity, decide
what course of action the individual believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation and the shareholder. If the individual does not comply
with these requirements, that failure may be grounds for a court to
disregard the corporate entity and hold the shareholder personally liable
for corporate obligations. 88 Thus even in the strongest case for
shareholder ownership of the corporation—the one-person corporation—
shareholder ownership is unclear. Thus, at the first step, the argument
from ownership is doubtful.
At the second step, the argument is that ownership entitles the
shareholders to wealth maximization. SWM advocates reason that
property owners are entitled to all of the property’s benefits. SWM is one
of those benefits, so the directors must SWM. The flaw in that reasoning
is that, without justification, it treats SWM—something a corporation
might do—as something a corporation must do.
If the ownership argument entitles shareholders to SWM, it is merely
an entitlement to money. No claim is made that treating shareholders as
owners improves the corporation’s economic performance. 89

See, e.g., Velasco, supra note 53, at 954 (“When a sole proprietor incorporates his
business, no one doubts that he has control and remains the owner.”).
87 Dodd, supra note 6 at 1146.
88 E.g., Pae v. Chul Yoon, 41 A.D.3d 681, 682, 838 N.Y.S.2d 172, 173 (2007) (holding sole
owner of corporation liable for corporate debt because the sole owner of the corporation
“dominated the corporation and was solely responsible for the wrongful failure of the corporation
to pay the plaintiff.”); In re Ma, 375 B.R. 387 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) (same).
89
Fisch, supra note 20 at 650 (“While ownership rights may be a consequence of shareholder
primacy, they do not justify shareholder primacy.”).
86
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B. Residual Ownership
SWM advocates argue that SWM maximizes social wealth. The
argument’s premise is that shareholders are the corporations’ residual
owners. 90 The argument proceeds in four steps: (1) because the
shareholders’ status as residual owners gives them the strongest
incentives to maximize corporate wealth, shareholders should control the
corporation, but (2) shareholders cannot control corporation, so (3) to
maximize corporate wealth, the directors who control the corporation
should SWM, and (4) that SWM will maximize both corporate wealth
and social wealth.
1. The Definition of “Residual Owners”
SWM advocates define “residual owners” or “residual claimants” as
the persons entitled to the corporation’s profits. 91 Although no law
entitles shareholders to the corporation’s profits, SWM advocates infer
the entitlement on three bases. First, they consider it an implied term of
the corporate contract. For example, Judge Frank Easterbrook wrote “for
most firms the expectation is that the residual riskbearers have contracted
for a promise to maximize long-run profits of the firm.” 92 Second, SWM
advocates infer the shareholder’s entitlement to profits from the law
governing corporate dissolution. That law provides for distribution of the
corporation’s assets first to the payment of debt with the remainder to
shareholders. 93 Third, SWM advocates infer the shareholder’s
entitlement to profits from principles of accounting. “[U]nder the current
E.g., George S. Geis, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and the Preclusion Problem, 100
VA. L. REV. 261, 262 (2014) (“Shareholders are the residual owners of a company.”); Michelle
M. Harner, Activist Distressed Debtholders: The New Barbarians at the Gate?, 89 WASH. U.L.
REV. 155, 171 (2011) (“Shareholders are the residual owners of the company.”).
91 Boatright, supra note 53, at 115 (“Just as customers buy a company’s products, equity
capital providers ‘buy’ the future profits of a firm.”); Bainbridge, supra note 55, at 1434
(“[N]onshareholders are paid first, but shareholders are entitled to whatever is left over after all
of the formers’ claims are satisfied.”); Fisch, supra note 22, at 656 (2006). (“[In the standard
economic literature] nonshareholder stakeholders receive a fixed claim, while shareholders have
a residual claim—they receive the surplus.”); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 67 (1991) (“[S]hareholders are the residual claimants
to the firm’s income. Creditors have fixed claims, and employees generally negotiate
compensation schedules in advance of performance.”).
92 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1446 (1989).
93 DGCL § 281(a). Velasco, supra note 53, at 913 (“A residual claimant is one who is
“entitle[d] . . . to whatever remains after the firm has met its explicit obligations and paid its fixed
claims.”).
90
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corporate accounting system, shareholders are assumed to be the sole
residual claimants, who are entitled to the whole amount of net
income.” 94 Profits not paid to the shareholders as dividends are recorded
as retained earnings or in some similar category. Retained earnings
appear in the equity section of the balance sheet, suggesting that they
belong to the shareholders. “If a company retains its earnings instead of
paying dividends, its stock price will increase, and this will benefit the
shareholders.” 95
By this definition shareholders are the sole residual owners. I will
refer to it as the “entitlement” definition to distinguish it from the
“actually received” definition usually employed by SWM’s opponents.
Under the actually received definition, the residual owners or residual
claimants are the persons who actually receive the marginal dollar of
corporate revenues. 96 By this definition, nonshareholder stakeholders are
often considered also to be residual owners. 97 For example, Stout
observes that
[S]hareholders are only one of several groups that can be described as
“residual claimants” or “residual risk bearers,” in the sense that they expect
to enjoy benefits (and sometimes to endure burdens) beyond those provided
in their explicit contracts. When the firm is doing well, for example,
employees receive raises and enjoy greater job security, managers get use
of a company jet, and bondholders enjoy increased protection from
corporate insolvency. Conversely, these groups suffer along with
shareholders when times are bad, as employees face “reductions in force,”
managers are told to fly coach, and debtholders face increased risk.
Directors use their control over the firm to reward many groups with larger
slices of the corporate pie when that pie is growing, and to spread the loss
among many when the pie is shrinking. 98

Satoru Otaka, Rethinking the Concept of Equity in Accounting: Origin and Attribution of
Business Profit, 2020 ACCT. ECON. LAW (2020), https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.
1515/ael-2019-0018/html.
95 Velasco, supra note 53, at 913.
96 Fisch, supra note 22, at 658 (“Residual claimants are simply, by definition, those who
receive a share of the firm’s surplus.”); Min Yan, A Control-Accountability Analysis of Dual Class
Share (DCS) Structures, 45 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2020) (“As residual proprietary claimants,
shareholders “reap the marginal dollar” of corporate profits and “suffer the marginal dollar” of
corporate losses.”); George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive
Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1100 (1995) (referring to the “residual claimants,
who gain or lose at the margin from the actions of the firm”).
97 Fisch, supra note 22, at 658 (“ [N]onshareholder stakeholders frequently have an explicit
contractual claim on a portion of the surplus.”).
98 Stout, supra note 60, at 1194-95.
94
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Professor Julian Velasco objects to the “actually-received” definition:
“Although everyone’s claim is at risk, not everyone is a residual
claimant. A residual claimant is one who is ‘entitled to whatever remains
after the firm has met its explicit obligations and paid its fixed claims.’” 99
The entitlement definition is not appropriate here, however, because
the residual owner argument relies on the shareholders’ incentives. Only
actual receipts, not entitlements, generate incentives.
Most SWM advocates acknowledge that shareholders are not the sole
residual claimants. 100 For example, Professor Eric Talley admits that “it
no longer seems factually accurate to depict shareholders as the sole
‘residual claimants’ of a corporation.” 101 Easterbrook and Professor
Daniel Fischel acknowledged that from the beginning: “The shareholders
receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of the marginal
costs.” 102
Stout, who led the opposition to SWM in the years before her
untimely death in 2016, also argued that shareholders did not have a legal
entitlement to profits because the law does not require that dividends be
paid.
Outside of the bankruptcy context, it is grossly misleading to suggest
that shareholders are somehow entitled to—much less actually receive—
everything left over after a company’s legal obligations have been met. To
the contrary, shareholders cannot get any money out of a functioning public
corporation unless two conditions are satisfied. First, under the standard
rules of corporate law, a company’s board of directors only has legal
authority to declare dividends to shareholders when the company is doing
well enough financially, as measured by whether it has (in accounting
terms) sufficient “retained earnings” or “operating profits.” Second, no
dividend can be paid unless the board decides to actually exercise its
authority by declaring a dividend.
[N]either contingency is met unless the board of directors wants it to
be. 103
Velasco, supra note 53, at 913.
Robert K. Rasmussen, The Search for Hercules: Residual Owners, Directors, and
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1445, 1451 (2004) (“[S]hareholders as
residual claimants are good proxies for a sole owner.”); Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, FirmSpecific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989
DUKE L.J. 173, 175 (1989) (“[S]hareholders retain plenary authority to guide the fate of a
corporate enterprise because . . . they have the greatest stake in the outcome of corporate decisionmaking.”).
101 Eric Talley, On the Demise of Shareholder Primacy (or, Murder on the James Trains
Express), 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1211, 1213 (2002).
102 EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 91, at 68 (emphasis added).
103 STOUT, supra note 4, at 40.
99
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2. Shareholders’ Incentives
At the residual ownership argument’s first step, SWM advocates
assert that shareholders should control the corporation because
shareholders “have the right incentives to exercise discretion.” 104 For
example, Rasmussen argues that “in healthy corporations, shareholders
as residual claimants are good proxies for a sole owner. This, at least in
part, is the justification for the proposition that boards should seek to
maximize shareholder wealth.” 105
Shareholders do not, however, have the right incentives. As partial
residual claimants, shareholders’ incentives are to increase both the value
of the firm and the value of their interest in the firm. One way for the
shareholders to increase the value of their interest in the firm is for the
shareholders to appropriate the value of other stakeholders’ interests.
Professor Jill Fisch has noted this conflict between the interests of
shareholders and other stakeholders:
Even when a corporation is financially sound, increasing the level of
risk to further the interests of shareholders may harm other stakeholders.
Greater risk may reduce the creditworthiness of the firm and hence the
value of its debt, or reduce job security, thereby reducing the value of the
firm to its workers. 106

SWM advocates fall back on the argument that despite the
imperfection of the shareholders’ incentives, the shareholders incentives
are still better aligned with the corporation’s interests than any other
party’s incentives. 107
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 53, at 403-06 (1983).
Robert K. Rasmussen, The Search for Hercules: Residual Owners, Directors, and
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1445, 1451 (2004). But see Kent
Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 283, 304 (1998) (“There is
nothing inherent in the nature of a residual claim that means that its holders’ interest should be
maximized above all others.”).
106 Fisch, supra note 22, at 659–60 (2006).
107 Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargain, 94 S. CAL. L. REV.
1467, 1476 (2021) (“Although the interests of corporate leaders do not perfectly align with the
interests of shareholders, the interests of corporate leaders and shareholders are substantially
linked.”); Kent Greenfield, The Failure of Corporate Law 54 (2006) (“This argument is predicated
on the assumption that the shareholders’ interests and the interests of the enterprise as whole are
more closely aligned than the interests of any other claimant and the firm.”); Michael S. Kang,
Shareholder Voting as Veto, 88 IND. L.J. 1299, 1306 (2013) (“Shareholders are the residual
owners of the company and at least putatively have interests most tightly aligned with the best
long-term interests of the company.”).
104
105
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Stout responds that the corporation’s incentives are perfectly aligned
with corporation’s interests. The corporation is a person entitled to its
income—the residual—and capable of deciding how to spend it. “The
corporation is its own residual claimant, and it is the board of directors
that decides what to do with the corporation’s residual.” 108 No proxy for
the corporation’s interests is needed because the corporation can act for
itself.
The second reason put forward to justify shareholder control is that
shareholders “cannot be adequately protected by contract. Rather, to
protect their interests, they must be given the right to control the firm.”109
That claim lacks credibility for two reasons. First, some shareholders do
protect themselves by contract. Venture capitalists are an example.
Second, the shareholders of most public companies invested despite
having no ability to control the firm.110 They impliedly contracted for the
low levels of shareholder control currently in existence.
3. Shareholders’ Inability to Control
Having decided that shareholders should control the corporation, the
residual ownership argument immediately runs up against the fact that
they cannot. Only about 9% of public corporations are “controlled,”
meaning that a single shareholder has enough voting power to elect a
majority of the directors.” 111 In most noncontrolled corporations,
shareholders suffer from a collective action problem. “When many are
entitled to vote, none of the voters expects his votes to decide the contest.
Consequently, none of the voters has the appropriate incentive at the
margin to study the firm’s affairs and vote intelligently.” 112 Corporate
law addresses the problem by restricting shareholder decision making to

STOUT, supra note 4, at 41.
Boatright, supra note 53, at 115 (“If [shareholders’] return on the asset they provide,
namely capital, is the residual earnings or profit of a firm, then this return is very insecure unless
they can ensure that the firm is operated for maximum profit.”); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra
note 12, at 449 (“[I]n most circumstances, the interests of equity investors in the firm—the firm’s
residual claimants— cannot adequately be protected by contract. Rather, to protect their interests,
they must be given the right to control the firm.”); Macey, supra note 53, at 36 (“[S]hareholders
face more daunting contracting problems than other constituencies.”).
110
Fisch, supra note 20, at 657 (“Contract theory suggests that shareholders would not
contribute capital unless operational decisions included a shareholder value objective, but, in
practice, shareholders are more likely to be concerned with the level of return on their investment
than their claim, relative to other stakeholders, to the firm's surplus.”).
111 LOPUCKI & VERSTEIN, supra note 76, at 586.
112 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 53, at 402.
108
109
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electing and removing the board. 113 But in most corporations,
shareholders are unable to exercise their power to elect and remove
directors because the election rules are stacked against the
shareholders. 114 The board can nominate directors and solicit proxies for
their nominees at corporate expense. If shareholders wish to nominate
directors and solicit proxies in their favor, the shareholders must do it at
their own expense and on the directors’ timetable. 115 As a result, in the
more than three thousand public companies in the United States, only
about 6 proxy contests occur each year. 116
4. Directors’ Fiduciary Duties
Because shareholders cannot control the corporation, the residual
owners’ argument continues, the directors should manage in the
shareholder’s place and for the shareholders’ benefit. That conclusion is
illogical. The shareholders were chosen to govern despite their imperfect
incentives because no party with perfect incentives was available. But if
the directors will govern as proxies, the directors should emulate the ideal
corporate interests, not the imperfect shareholder interests.
The correct conclusion to reach from the residual owner argument is
that corporate wealth is best maximized by requiring director loyalty to
the corporation alone. By mandating the maximization of corporate
wealth and claiming it is identical to shareholder wealth, Delaware feeds
a SWM narrative that Delaware does not follow.
5. Social Wealth Maximization
Most SWM advocates do not consider SWM the ultimate goal. They
endorse SWM on the incorrect theory that SWM maximizes both
corporate wealth and social wealth. 117 The claim is that making
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(k) (“Any director or the entire board of directors may be
removed, with or without cause, by the holders of a majority of the shares then entitled to vote at
an election of directors.”); Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Governance and Countervailing Power,
74 BUS. LAW. 1, 6 (2019) (“Under what has been referred to as ‘the received legal model of the
corporation, ‘the board of directors manages the corporation’s business and makes policy; the
officers act as agents of the board and execute its decisions; and the shareholders elect the
board.’”).
114 Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 569 (“[S]hareholders lack both the de jure right and the de
facto power to divest the board of its control.”).
115 LOPUCKI & VERSTEIN, supra note 76, at 237-40 (describing the rules for election and
removal of directors).
116 Id. at 239.
117 Supra note 15 (listing scholars).
113
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shareholders wealthier not only makes corporations wealthier but also
makes society as a whole wealthier.
Professor Michael Jensen famously asserted that “200 years’ worth
of work in economics and finance indicate that social welfare is
maximized when all firms in an economy maximize total firm value.” 118
He cited nothing in support of that proposition. Martin and Petty provide
a clue as to the possible basis for Jensen’s assertion. “This idea [that
maximizing shareholder value maximizes social wealth] can be traced
back to Adam Smith’s concept of the invisible hand.” 119 Smith wrote that
“[b]y pursuing his own interest [the capitalist] frequently promotes that
of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote
it.” 120
Most scholars do not believe that SWM maximizes social wealth.121
The obvious problem with the SWM-maximizes-social-wealth claim is
that corporations can increase their profits by externalizing their social
costs. 122 As a result, corporations’ “profit-seeking operations contribute
to a wide array of society’s problems and impose serious negative
externalities on employees, communities, consumers, and the
environment.” 123 Jensen acknowledges as much by adding an exception
to his assertion for “when monopolies or externalities exist” and listing
Jensen, supra note 22, at 239; accord, Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties
to Corporate Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 62 (1996) (“Therefore, maximizing the present
value of the corporation’s earnings stream maximizes the total value of the corporation and, thus,
maximizes the corporation’s contribution to social wealth.”); Donald J. Kochan, The Purpose of
a Corporation is to Seek Profits, Not Popularity, THE HILL (Aug. 19, 2021, 2:30 PM),
https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/568595-he-purpose-of-the-corporation-is-to-seek-profits-notpopularity/ (“As corporations and their shareholders maximize wealth, resources flow into the
economy in ways that necessarily increase overall social welfare.”).
119 John Martin & William Petty, Shareholder Value Maximization—Is There a Role for
Corporate Social Responsibility? 21 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 110, 111 (2009).
120 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 423 (1937), https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.
dli.2015.207956/page/n485/mode/2up.
121 E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 104 (1986) (“Shareholder wealth and social wealth are not synonymous.
The former can be enhanced in ways that do not increase, and may even decrease, the latter.”).
122 JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 2013)
(“Virtually everyone recognizes that corporate profit maximization can sometimes inflict a greater
harm on society than the gain it creates for shareholders.”). [LML: I have requested a copy of
the current edition from the publisher.]
123 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Roberto Tallarita, The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder
Governance, 106 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 168 (2020). See also Bakan, supra note 2, at 61 (“[T]he
corporation’s built-in compulsion to externalize its costs is at the root of many of the world’s
social and environmental ills.”).
118
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“water and air pollution” as “classic examples” of externalities. 124 Other
externalized social costs include the release microplastics and other
pathogens, the generation of financial crises, the social effects of child
and slave labor, violations of human rights, the monopolization of the
water supply, the movement of populations for temporary employment,
the abandonment of older employees, and the release of greenhouse gases
that may render the planet uninhabitable.
SWM advocates respond that government should solve
externalization problems through regulation, instead of interfering in
corporate governance. 125 Regulation is not, however, a plausible solution.
First, government regulation has not prevented the externalizations now
under discussion. Refusing to address them through corporate
governance means they will continue. 126 Second, in many instances,
SWM caused the externalizations. That is, but for the SWM norm, the
Jensen, supra note 22, at 239 (“When monopolies or externalities exist, the valuemaximizing criterion does not maximize social welfare. By externalities I mean situations in
which the decision-maker does not bear the full cost or benefit consequences of his or her choices,
water and air pollution are classic examples.”).
125 Ilan Benshalom, Who Should Decide Whether the Apple Is Rotten? Tax Disclosure and
Corporate Political Agency, 6 COLUM. J. TAX. L. 86, 117 (2014) (“Goals other than wealth
maximization are best promoted through the political arena.”); Jensen, supra note 22, at 246.
124

Resolving externality and monopoly problems is the legitimate domain of the
government in its rule-setting function. Those who care about resolving
monopoly and externality issues will not succeed if they look to firms to resolve
these issues voluntarily. Firms that try to do so either will be eliminated by
competitors who choose not to be so civic minded, or will survive only by
consuming their economic rents in this manner.
Id.; Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1, 21 (2016) (“[R]egulating substance generally should be superior to government
interference with corporate governance to control externalities.”); David G. Yosifon, The Public
Choice Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsibility After Citizens United, 89
N.C. L. REV. 1197, 1202 (2011).

Even where such problems emerge, however, the standard account insists that
the solution does not reside in altering the shareholder primacy norm at the heart
of firm governance. Instead, firms should be restrained from engaging in such
exploitative conduct by external governmental regulation, such as labor laws,
consumer protection statutes, and environmental codes.
Id.
Part of the reason for regulation’s failure is that corporations, as participants in the
political process, resist regulation.
126
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corporations would not have externalized the costs. Eliminating the norm
would eliminate those externalizations. Third, remediation and clean-up
are highly inefficient processes. In most cases, the government’s cleanup costs greatly exceed the corporation’s cost of pollution avoidance.
Preventing the pollution by eliminating the SWM norm is the most
efficient strategy for reducing clean-up costs. Lastly, SWM creates
incentives for corporations to lobby against the adoption of the necessary
regulations and corporations often do. 127
IV. THE AGENCY ARGUMENT
In a frequently cited paper, Jensen and Professor William H.
Meckling proposed an agency-cost theory of the public corporation. 128
They assumed that the shareholders owned the corporation and posited
that (1) shareholders should be viewed as principals and managers as their
agents, (2) the implied contract that creates the firm obligates managers
to conduct the business to maximize the benefit to shareholders, and (3)
the problem was to induce the “agent” to “behave as if he were
maximizing the ‘principal’s’ welfare.” 129
Jensen and Meckling claimed that “the relationship between the
stockholders and managers of a corporation fit the definition of a pure
agency relationship.” 130 They defined “agency” as “a contract under
which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating
some decision making authority to the agent.” 131
In doing so, Jensen and Meckling demonstrated a profound
misunderstanding of the corporation. Corporations are created by law, not
contract. 132 “Agency is the fiduciary”—not contractual—relationship in
which the agent acts “subject the principal’s control.” 133 More
Tim Wu, The Goals of the Corporation and the Limits of the Law, THE CLS BLUE SKY
BLOG, Sept. 3, 2019 (“[T]he primacy model logically incentivizes corporations to prevent
government from acting in ways that might be social welfare-maximizing.”).
128 Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
129 Id. at 309.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 308.
132 See, e.g., DGCL § 106 (Upon the filing with the Secretary of State of the certificate of
incorporation . . . the incorporator or incorporators . . . shall, from the date of filing, be and
constitute a body corporate.”); MBCA § 2.03 (a) (“[T]he corporate existence being when the
articles of incorporation are filed.”).
133 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
127
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specifically, the principal must have “the power to give interim
instructions.” 134 The relationship between the shareholders and the
managers is not an agency relationship because the shareholders lack the
right to control the managers and cannot give the managers interim
instructions. 135 Statutes—not contracts—confer the authority to manage
the corporation’s affairs on the board of directors. 136 The shareholders—
even acting unanimously—have no right to direct the managers’
decisions. 137 They do have the right to remove and replace the directors,
but they can tell neither the directors nor their replacements what to do.
When the shares are widely held, shareholders usually lack the practical
ability to exercise their right to remove and replace. Together, these rules
and circumstances confer on directors—not shareholders—the power to
manage the corporation. Even though legal scholars The agency
relationship about which Jensen and Meckling theorize bears no
resemblance to the actual relationship between shareholders and directors
in public corporations. Legal scholars have, nevertheless, written
hundreds of articles analyzing “agency costs.” 138
V. IMPLIED CONTRACT ARGUMENT
Jensen and Meckling’s second claim is that an implied contract
between shareholders and directors requires directors to SWM. That
claim fails because an implied contract must have a factual basis in the
Johnson v. Priceline.com, Inc., 711 F.3d 271, 278 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The power to give
interim instructions distinguishes principals in agency relationships from those who contract to
receive services provided by persons who are not agents.”).
135 STOUT, supra note 4, at 42 (“[A] hallmark of agency is that the principal retains the right
to control the agent’s behavior.”).
136 E.g., 8 Del. Code 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under
this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors . . . .”); Fisch, supra
note 22, at 649 (Corporate managers, unlike traditional agents, are not directly controlled by their
principals in that the source of their power is largely statutory.”).
137 See, e.g., CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008)
(“Indeed, it is well established that stockholders of a corporation subject to the DGCL may not
directly manage the business and affairs of the corporation, at least without specific authorization
in either the statute or the certificate of incorporation.
138 E.g., Mark J. Roe, Rents and Their Corporate Consequences, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1463,
1465 (2001) (“Higher rents induce higher managerial agency costs for shareholders; higher
agency costs induce shareholders to strengthen the inside-the-firm structures that keep higher
agency costs within bounds.”); James Cameron Spindler, Vicarious Liability for Managerial
Myopia, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 161 (2017) (“In a principal-agent model, shareholders choose whether
to award equity compensation to a myopic (short-termist) manager.”).
134
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statements or conduct of the parties, 139 and no factual basis exists for
believing SWM is the intent the parties in most corporations.
Rarely do provisions of corporate certificates, bylaws, or
prospectuses suggest that directors will SWM. In 2020, the Business
Roundtable claimed that its 1997 statement had “defined a corporation’s
principal purpose as maximizing shareholder return.” 140 But in fact, the
1997 statement said merely that “the principal objective of a business
enterprise is to generate economic returns to its owners.” 141 It made no
mention of SWM. The 2019 version removed the “principal objective”
language and substituted a commitment “to deliver value to all of [our
stakeholders], for the future success of our companies, our communities
and our country.” 142
In an empirical study of the corporate governance policies of the
companies whose CEOs signed the 2019 Business Roundtable Statement,
Bebchuk and Tallarita concluded that “a majority included an explicit
statement in support of shareholder primacy.” 143 But shareholder primacy
as Bebchuk and Tallarita defined it is not SWM. Of 128 corporate
governance policies studied, only three (2%) referred to maximization of
profits, shareholder wealth, or shareholder value (in those or other
words). 144 Most of the policies Bebchuk and Tallarita classified as
supporting shareholder primacy merely said that the board’s role was to
represent or promote the interests of the corporation’s shareholders.
Nearly all the policies studied are consistent with an unstated board
intention to also serve the interests of other stakeholders. 145 Two of the
139

Beth Israel Med. Ctr. v. Horizon Blue Cross & Blue Shield of New Jersey, Inc., 448 F.3d
573, 582 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The terms of an implied-in-fact contract turn on the conduct of the
parties.”); No other kind of implied contract exists. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 4,
comment b (1981) (“As opposed to the inferred from fact (“implied in fact”) contract, the
“implied in law” quasi-contract is no contract at all, but a form of the remedy of restitution.”).
140
One Year Later: Purpose of a Corporation, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (undated),
https://purpose.businessroundtable.org/
141 Statement on Corporate Governance (1997) (stating that “the principal objective of a
business enterprise is to generate economic returns to its owners).
142 Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Sept. 6, 2019),
https://system.businessroundtable.org/app/uploads/sites/5/2021/02/BRT-Statement-on-the-Purpo
se-of-a-Corporation-Feburary-2021-compressed.pdf.
143 Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 21, at 1036.
144 Id. at 1060 (The Home Depot), 1055 (Eastman Chemical Company). Southern Company,
Corporate Governance Guidelines, Oct. 21, 2019, at 6 (The board’s “role is to maximize longterm stockholder value.”).
145 Duke Energy is the borderline case. Its policy requires that the board “act solely in the
best interest of the Corporation’s shareholders.” I do not read that language as requiring
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128 companies (2%) expressly authorized the board to act in the interests
of nonshareholder stakeholders. 146
In another study, Bebchuk and Tallarita provide persuasive evidence
that directors protected shareholders and managers in sales of companies
to private equity 147 and failed to protect employees, communities, and
suppliers in those sales. 148 The sales studied included some governed by
constituency statutes. From that evidence, Bebchuk and Tallarita infer
that directors would not protect employees, communities, and suppliers
in ongoing operations in a stakeholder governance regime. 149 That
extension of their findings seems unwarranted. Directors’ incentives to
protect stakeholders are greater in ongoing operations because ongoing
operations require the stakeholders’ cooperation and may not require the
shareholders’ cooperation—because the shareholders’ capital is lockedin. The opposite is true in a sale. Sale requires the shareholders’
affirmative vote approving the sale, 150 and sale ordinarily does not
require the other stakeholders’ cooperation. Bebchuk and Tallarita miss
this point in the section where they address the objection that “the validity
of [their] conclusion is limited to the acquisition context and does not
extend to ongoing-concern decisions.” 151
Consistent with Jensen and Meckling, Bainbridge argues that SWM
is a “bargained for right of the shareholders.” 152 He asserts two bases for
his conclusion. The first is that SWM “is not only the law, but is also a
basic feature of corporate ideology.” But none of the sources he cites in
support of the proposition mention the concept of maximization.153
Bainbridge’s second basis is that directors’ interests are often aligned
with those of shareholders through compensation or reputational
maximization of shareholder value. It is consistent with an intention to also act solely in the best
interest of the other stakeholders.
146 Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 21, at 1057 (“Finally, only two companies in the BRT
Board Sample (Cummins and International Paper) fall within the category of stakeholderism.”).
147 Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 123, at 1507-23.
148 Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 107, at 1519 (“Our findings indicate that . . . corporate
leaders did not use their power to negotiate any protections for customers, suppliers, or
creditors.”).
149 Id. at 1534 (“[O]ngoing-concern decisions should not be expected to display more
stakeholderist inclinations than final-period decisions.”); Id. (“At a minimum, our findings should
give stakeholderists pause and require them to examine the factors that caused the failure of
constituency statutes in the cases we considered, and whether these factors would not similarly
undermine stakeholderism more generally.”).
150 DGCL § 251(c) (shareholder vote on mergers), § 271(a) (shareholder vote on asset sales).
151
Bebchuk et al., supra note 107, at 1534.
152
Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 574.
153

Id. at 576.
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considerations. 154 That alignment does suggest that directors will work in
the interests of shareholders, but suggests nothing about maximization.
Team production and stakeholder theory advocates argue
persuasively that public companies provide substantial benefits in excess
of legal entitlements to nonshareholder stakeholders. 155 As the
company’s fortunes rise and fall, the directors adjust the payments to
stakeholders, both above and below the stakeholders’ legal entitlements.
If true, the stakeholders have implied contracts to receive those payments,
and the shareholders do not have implied contracts for SWM.
VI. THE SHAREHOLDER MONITORING ARGUMENT
Corporate directors have fiduciary duties to serve the interests of the
corporation and/or its shareholders. 156 SWM advocates argue that if
directors are also permitted to serve the interests of other stakeholders,
directors will use that discretion to serve their own interests.157
(Ironically, it appears that managers have already done so. CEO
compensation in the U.S. is far higher than in other countries. 158) The
solution, SWM advocates argue, is to require the corporations to SWM.
154

Id. at 576-77.

Supra notes 98, 103, 106, and accompanying text.
156
Supra, Part III.B.4.
157 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Bishops and the Corporate Stakeholder Debate, 4 VILL. J.L.
& INV. MGMT. 3, 21 (2002) (“There is a very real risk that directors and managers given discretion
to consider interests other than shareholder wealth maximization will use stakeholder interests as
a cloak for actions taken to advance their own selfish interests.”); Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate
Law As Myth, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 923, 953 (2020) (“If corporate directors and corporate managers
stop believing in the myth that they are supposed to maximize value for shareholders, there would
be precious little, if anything, to constrain them from simply pursuing their own, idiosyncratic
notions of what is “best” for whatever group of corporate constituents they idiosyncratically and
serendipitously happened to prefer at a particular moment in time.”); Harry G. Hutchison, Choice,
Progressive Values, and Corporate Law: A Reply to Greenfield, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 437, 461-62
(2010) (“the claim that expanded stakeholder governance leads to diminished accountability of
corporate managers is not new”).
158
Statistica Research Department, Average Annual CEO Compensation Worldwide in 2017,
by country, STATISTICA, (Aug. 5, 2022) https://www.statista.com/statistics/424154/averageannual-ceo-compensation-worldwide/ (showing U.S. compensation at $14.25 million, nearly
double the next highest country); but see Nuno Fernandes, et al., Are US CEOs Paid More? New
International Evidence, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1341639 (“We find
that the US pay premium is economically modest: US CEOs earn an average of 26% more than
their foreign counterparts in 2006, far less than the 100% or 200% premiums documented in the
(limited) academic research.”).
155
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The adoption of a single metric, they argue, is necessary to enable
directors to make decisions, 159 for shareholders to monitor the directors’
success, 160 and for the market to allocate resources efficiently. 161
Jensen argued that directors could not make reasoned decisions
without a command that they maximize something:
It is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension at
the same time unless the dimensions are monotone transformations of one
another. Thus, telling a manager to maximize current profits, market share,
future growth in profits, and anything else one pleases will leave that
manager with no way to make a reasoned decision. 162

Other SWM advocates agree. 163
Stout responds “that perspective ignores the obvious human capacity
to balance, albeit imperfectly, competing interests and responsibilities.
Balancing interests—decently satisfying several sometimes-competing
objectives, rather than trying to ‘maximize’ only one—is the rule and not
Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 581 (“Absent the shareholder wealth maximization norm,
the board would lack a determinate metric for assessing options. Because stakeholder
decisionmaking models necessarily create a two masters problem, such models inevitably lead to
indeterminate results.”); Henry Hansmann, How Close Is the End of History?, 31 J. CORP. L. 745,
747 (2006) (“[I]mposing affirmative fiduciary duties on management to protect the interests of
two or more groups simultaneously is unworkable.”).
160 CLARK, supra note 23, at 679 (“A single, objective goal like profit maximization is more
easily monitored than a multiple, vaguely defined goal like the fair and reasonable
accommodation of all affected interests.”); Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the
Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1164–65 (1990) (“[M]anagement
performance cannot readily be measured once stock price is no longer the lodestar.”); Stefan J.
Padfield, Corporate Governance and the Omnipresent Specter of Political Bias, 104 MARQ. L.
REV. 47, 55 (2020) (“[A]llowing or requiring managers to consider impacts other than profit
provides cover for self-dealing and exacerbates the agency problem.”).
161 Romano, supra note 160, at 1165 (“Also, if corporations pursue objectives other than
stock price maximization, the market’s allocative efficiency will be compromised.”).
162 Jensen, supra note 22, at 238.
163 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 91, at 36 (1991) ([A] manager told to serve two masters
(a little for the equity holders, a little for the community) has been freed of both and is answerable
to neither.”); Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial
Organization, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2063, 2065 (2001) (“[A] stakeholder measure of managerial
accountability could leave managers so much discretion that managers could easily pursue their
own agenda, one that might maximize neither shareholder, employee, consumer, nor national
wealth, but only their own.”); Bainbridge, supra note 157, at 23 (2002) (“[A]bsent the shareholder
wealth maximization norm, both boards and courts will lack a determinate metric for assessing
options.”).
159
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the exception in human affairs.” 164
Even accepting Jensen’s limitation of a single objective, better
alternatives than SWM exist. Jensen himself proposed maximizing “the
total long-run market value of the firm” with the firm defined to include
both equity and debt—thus extending board protection to creditors. 165 A
better single objective would be to maximize production (without
externalizing its costs). Production maximization without externalization
would commit corporations directly to maximizing social wealth 166—the
goal most SWM maximization advocates claim to be pursuing already.167
Hart and Zingles point out that efficiency requires shareholder utility
maximization, not SWM. 168 To illustrate the importance of that
distinction, assume that corporations made shareholders fabulously rich
(SWM) while destroying the planet (a failure to maximize shareholder
utility). Such wealth generation would be an obvious mistake.
Stout colorfully characterizes SWM advocates’ choice to maximize
wealth as “simply assuming—without explanation or justification—that
the only shareholder whose interests count is the shareholder who is
short-sighted, opportunistic, undiversified, and without a conscience.”169
In choosing to SWM, SWM advocates are choosing to maximize the
wrong metric because it is the metric they think they can measure.
SWM advocates argue that “problems of incomplete contracts can
only be resolved if there is an adequate mechanism for monitoring the
behavior of managers.” 170 Having already concluded that the
shareholders should do that monitoring, 171 the advocates further conclude
that directors should maximize shareholder wealth as measured by the
STOUT, supra note 4, at 108.
Jensen, supra note 22, at 236 (“[V]alue maximization states that managers should make
all decisions so as to increase the total long-run market value of the firm. Total value is the sum
of the values of all financial claims on the firm-including equity, debt, preferred stock, and
warrants.”).
164
165

166

That is, they would be maximizing gross domestic product (GDP).

Supra note 117 and accompanying text.
168 Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not
Market Value, 2 J. L. FIN. & ACCT. 247 (2017) (arguing that “shareholder welfare maximization
should replace market value maximization as the proper objective of companies”); Mocsary,
supra note 13, at 1323 (“Although Professor Friedman is frequently quoted for his support of
shareholder wealth maximization, his careful use of the word “generally” suggests that, although
it may not be commonplace, he apparently believed that shareholder ends need not be monetary.”).
169 STOUT, supra note 4, at 10.
170 Boot & Macey, supra note 33, at 364.
171 CLARK, supra note 23, at 389-90 (“[G]iving control to the residual claimants will place
the power to monitor the performance of participants in the firm and the power to control shirking,
waste, and so forth in the hands of those who have the best incentive to use the power. . . .”).
167
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stock price. 172 Professor Mitu Gulati explains:
[A]ccording to the conventional model, a company’s stockholders can
get an accurate picture of managerial performance—albeit from an ex post
perspective—by monitoring the market price of the company’s securities.
Under the strong or semistrong forms of efficient markets theory, a
company’s stock price reflects either all existing information or all public
information about the company. Given the information content
of stock prices, investors can monitor price movements as a proxy for
managerial performance. Good management practices will result in higher
stock prices; managerial failure to serve corporate interests will result in
the market’s devaluation of the company’s securities. 173

Stock prices are, however, a poor measure of managerial performance
for at least three reasons. First, managerial performance is only one of
many determinants of stock prices. Others include stock market
conditions, product market conditions, labor market conditions,
stakeholder cooperation, government policies, wars, path dependencies,
and technological changes. Stock price analysts can and do attempt to
control for determinants outside the directors’ control. But monitoring
directors through stock analysts would be far more complicated than
monitoring stock prices.
Second, stock prices are not an accurate measure of the corporation’s
value. 174 In Smith v Van Gorkum, the Delaware Supreme Court held it to
be gross negligence for the Trans Union board to rely on the stock price
Romano, supra note 160, at 1164–65 (“[M]anagement performance cannot readily be
measured once stock price is no longer the lodestar.”); contra, CLARK, supra note 23, at 18 n.46
(“[M]anagers who attempt to maximize the market value of their company’s common stock will
take account of the probable long-range results of the company’s activities as well as its bottom
line in the current year.”).
173 Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear A Good Thing Is Coming to an End: The
Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 692-93 (1999). Lawrence E. Mitchell, The
Partner-Manager: Some Thoughts on Bebchuk and Fried, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 57, 62 (2010)
(“Stock price came to be the most easily accessed metric and—in an era in which markets were
said to be highly efficient—appeared to serve as a reasonable proxy for corporate performance.”).
174 Paul H. Edelman et al., Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1434 (2014) (“[W]e hear corporate boards routinely making the claim that
long-term value is different from stock price value.”); Fisch, supra note 22, at 672 (2006)
(“[S]tock price is a poor measure of firm value. Even in a market that is relatively informationally
efficient, it is unlikely that market prices reflect fundamental value.”); Jensen, supra note 22, at
246 (“The market is inevitably ignorant of many managerial actions and opportunities, at least in
the short-run.”); Jeff Schwartz, De Facto Shareholder Primacy, 79 MD. L. REV. 652, 666 (2020)
(“The prediction of inaccurate stock prices is backed by a mountain of empirical evidence.”).
172
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in selling the company. 175 In 2004, Stout observed that “the evidence at
this point does not support the close correlation between price and value
predicted by orthodox efficient markets theory.” 176 Famed economist
Fisher Black attempted to quantify the correlation:
[W]e might define an efficient market as one in which price is within
a factor of 2 of value, i.e., the price is more than half of value and less than
twice value. The factor of 2 is arbitrary, of course. Intuitively, though, it
seems reasonable to me, in the light of sources of uncertainty about value
and the strength of the forces tending to cause price to return to value. 177

That estimate finds support in stock market crashes in which prices fall
by nearly half in the absence of significant changes in the firms and then
quickly recover. 178
Third, managers can and do manipulate stock prices. 179 The most
obvious ways are by massive corporate trading in the corporation’s own
shares, 180 artificially increasing profits through “earnings

Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v. Stephens,
965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009) (“The parties do not dispute that a publicly-traded stock price is solely
a measure of the value of a minority position and, thus, market price represents only the value of
a single share. Nevertheless . . . the Board assessed the adequacy of the premium over market . . .
solely by comparing it with Trans Union’s current and historical stock price.”).
176 Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New
Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 667 (2003).
177 Fisher Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 533 (1986)
178 Faith Stevelman & Sarah C. Haan, Boards in Information Governance, 23 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 179, 208 (2020) (“The shocking drop and then stunning climb of stock market prices after the
spring of 2020 has not enhanced faith in stock market efficiency.”); Stout, supra note 176, at 636
(“[I]n the Spring of 2000, the Standard & Poors 500 Index of 500 leading companies topped
1,500. By October 2002, the S&P Index was hovering near 775, a nearly fifty percent decline in
value.”).
179 Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J.
1554, 1561 (2015) (“Short-term shareholders, on the other hand, may benefit when managers
engage in what I call “costly price-boosting manipulation”—actions that boost the short-term
stock price at the expense of the pie generated over the long term.”); STOUT, supra note 4, at 6768 (arguing that “managers can raise share price without improving real economic performance”);
Jensen, supra note 22, at 246; (“The market is inevitably ignorant of many managerial actions and
opportunities, at least in the short-run.”).
180 Fried, supra note 179, at 1561 (Over any given five-year period, U.S. firms buy and sell
stock equivalent in value to approximately 30% of their aggregate market capitalization.”).
175
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management,” 181 misstating their profits, 182 exercising GAAP-permitted
“judgment,” 183 and taking “one-time” charges that analysts will ignore.184
In light of managers’ obvious ability to manipulate stock prives, SWM
advocates and courts retreat to the position that shareholders should rely
on “long-term profits” to evaluate managers. 185 But no separate stock
price based on long-term profits exists. 186
Under agency theory, the purpose of SWM was to enable
Park, supra note 23, at 478 (“Company managers that deliver predictable earnings prove
that they can accurately forecast earnings growth and follow through on their plans. There is
evidence that companies that meet market expectations are rewarded with a higher stock price.”);
JOHN R. GRAHAM ET AL., VALUE DESTRUCTION AND FINANCIAL REPORTING DECISIONS, at 8 (“80%
of survey participants report that they would decrease discretionary spending on R&D, advertising
and maintenance to meet an earnings target.”).
182 Sharon Hannes & Avraham Tabbach, Executive Stock Options: The Effects of
Manipulation on Risk Taking, 38 J. CORP. L. 533, 557 (2013) (“Inaccurate accounting
and earnings management came at a huge cost to the firms involved and to the U.S. market as a
whole.”).
183 William O. Fisher, Where Were the Counselors? Reflections on Advice Not Given and
the Role of Attorneys in the Accounting Crisis, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 29, 37–38 (2004) (Indeed, two
companies in the same industry can undergo virtually the same economic experience in a quarter,
yet report GAAP numbers that differ dramatically.”); Richard C. Sauer, Financial Statement
Fraud: The Boundaries of Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 57 BUS. LAW. 955, 979
(2002) (“[I]mprecise accounting standards in the hands of a clever practitioner can allow wide
latitude for earnings management with limited legal consequences.”).
184 Fisher, supra note 183, at 38 (“For example, if you decide at some point to discontinue a
particular line of business, you may take a “restructuring” charge to record, at the time the line is
discontinued, the costs that you anticipate the discontinuation will create. This, too, is an
estimate.”).
185 Bhagat & Hubbard, supra note 13, at 24 (“Corporate focus on long-term shareholder value
maximization, remains the best way to enhance value and the broader corporate contribution to
society.”); Jensen, supra note 22, at 236 (“value maximization states that managers should make
all decisions so as to increase the total long-run market value of the firm.”); CLARK, supra note
23, at 678 (“[T]he profit-maximizing norm does not imply a commitment to short-run profits at
the expense of long-run profits. All intelligent formulations of the norm, such as the ‘net present
value’ or ‘stock market value’ ones, implicitly assume that a wealth-maximizing balance should
be struck between long- and short-run profits.”).
186 Musibau Babatunde & Olawoye Olaniran, The Effects of Internal and External
Mechanism on Governance and Performance of Corporate Firms in Nigeria, 7 CORP. OWNERSHIP
& CONTROL 330, 338 (2009) (“Jensen himself offers no clue on how to obtain an accurate measure
of the long-term value of the firm, let alone offer an indication of how to assess the possible impact
of an investment on that long term value.”); Fried, supra note 179, at 1568–69 (“Legal academics
of a variety of persuasions have long believed that managers should ignore the short-term stock
price and focus on maximizing long-term shareholder value.”).
181
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shareholders—the people with their own money at stake—to monitor the
directors’ performance. However, as Bainbridge put it, “[i]n general,
shareholders of public corporations have neither the legal right, the
practical ability, nor the desire to exercise the kind of control necessary
for meaningful monitoring of the corporation’s agents.” 187 Bainbridge
proposed a director primacy theory of the corporation in which the duty
of unmonitored directors is to SWM. 188
VII. CORPORATE PERFORMANCE
Prominent defenders of SWM warn that ending the policy may
adversely affect the corporation and the economy. Romano predicts that
“if corporations pursue objectives other than stock price maximization,
the market’s allocative efficiency will be compromised.” 189 Bainbridge
cautions that “the basic rule that shareholder interests come first . . . has
helped produce an economy that is dominated by public corporations,
which in turn has produced the highest standard of living of any society
in the history of the world.” 190 Rock warns that “tinkering with the law
of corporate purpose threatens to disrupt the coherence of the corporate
form, a form that has been one of the great wealth generating innovations
of the last 150 years.” 191 Bebchuk and Tallarita claim that “[b]y making
corporate leaders less accountable and more insulated from shareholder
oversight, acceptance of stakeholderism would increase slack and hurt
performance, reducing the economic pie available to shareholders and
stakeholders.” 192
These warnings imply that the ending SWM threatens prosperity. At
least four circumstances assure that it does not. First, foreign corporations
not subject to the SWM norm are competitive with U.S. corporations. As
Strine explains:
Most European countries have corporate laws that expressly state that
the corporation’s managers have a duty to consider all the stakeholders of
the corporation, not just stockholders, when managing the enterprise. For
example, German corporate law directs managers to attend to the interests
of shareholders, employees, and society as a whole. Likewise, in France,
Bainbridge, supra note 21, at 568.
Id. at 574 (“[D]irector primacy does not discard the concept of shareholder wealth
maximization.”).
189 Romano, supra note 160, at 1165 (1990).
190 Bainbridge, supra note 55, at 1446 (1993).
191 Edward B. Rock, For Whom Is the Corporation Managed in 2020? The Debate Over
Corporate Purpose, 76 BUS. LAW. 363, 394 (2021).
192 Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 123, at 92.
187
188
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corporate managers are encouraged to consider the interests of all
constituencies in running the corporation. The Netherlands takes a similar
approach. Even in the United Kingdom, which is known for its nonfrustration regime, the normative duty of corporate directors is to ‘promote
the success of the company,’ which requires directors to take into account
the interests of all constituencies. Additionally, E.U. ‘harmonization laws’
that provide for the creation of a “European Company” require such a
company to take the interests of creditors, customers, and employees into
account when making business decisions. 193

That companies incorporated in those countries are competitive with U.S.
corporations in numerous markets, demonstrates that failure to SWM is
not fatal.
Second, American public companies have been declining in numbers
over the past several decades, 194 while domestic 195 public companies
world-wide have been increasing in numbers. 196 That suggests that
companies subject to the SWM norm may be less efficient than
companies not subject to it.
Third, a substantial minority of American public companies are
incorporated in states with constituency statutes. As a result, their boards
are not required to SWM and may consider the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders. Examples include Comcast and PNC Financial
in Pennsylvania and Johnson and Johnson in New Jersey. As do foreign
corporations, those constituency-state corporations demonstrate the
competitiveness of non-SWM companies.
Fourth, little evidence exists that U.S. companies actually SWM.
Delaware law requires corporate wealth maximization, but deliberately
makes that requirement unenforceable. As a practical matter, directors
can and do consider any interests they chose. 197 Corporations in all U.S.
jurisdictions are pursuing objectives other than SWM, and the sky has not
fallen.
Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Soviet Constitution Problem in Comparative Corporate Law:
Testing the Proposition That European Corporate Law Is More Stockholder Focused Than U.S.
Corporate Law, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1247-48 (2016); accord, Roe, supra note 163, at 2072.
194 Ruchir Sharma, “The rescues ruining capitalism,” Wall Street Journal, July 24, 2020,
wsj.com (Before the pandemic . . . the number of publicly traded U.S. companies had fallen by
nearly half, to around 4,400, since the peak in 1996.”).
195 The World Bank, Listed domestic companies, total (choose “Details”) https://data.world
bank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.LDOM.NO?page=1 (“A company is considered domestic when it
is incorporated in the same country as where the exchange is located.”).
196 Id. (graph showing increase in numbers of listed domestic companies from about 15,000
in 1978 to about 44,000 in 2007 and 43,000 in 2019).
197 Macey, supra note 157, at 950 (2020) (“The reality is that directors essentially can do
whatever they want.”).
193
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Exorcising the SWM norm will have little effect on the substance of
corporate decision making. Its principal effect may be to eliminate the
hypocrisy of having a norm requiring SWM while directors do not SWM.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Once powerful, SWM is now in decline. The ALI Restatement of
Corporate Governance draft rejects SWM, proposing instead that “the
objective of a corporation is to enhance the economic value of the
corporation.” 198 This Article examined the arguments for SWM, finding
that none plausibly led to the conclusion that SWM improves corporate
performance.
The argument from law. The argument is that the law requires SWM,
which has led to improved corporate performance. In fact, the law of most
states rejects SWM, the law of Delaware requires corporate wealth
maximization claiming it to be the equivalent of SWM, and SWM is not
enforceable in any American jurisdiction. SWM cannot have improved
corporate performance because SWM isn’t in effect.
The ownership argument. The argument is that the shareholders own
the corporation so the directors should SWM. Although shareholders are
commonly referred to as the corporation’s owners, most scholars do not
think they are. But even conceding that the directors should treat the
shareholders as owners, the ownership argument fails. Most business
owners choose not to SWM, so SWM does not follow logically from
ownership. Even assuming shareholders own the corporation and SWM
should follow, that in no way suggests that the corporation would perform
better as a result.
The residual ownership argument. The argument is that shareholders
should manage because, as residual owners, they are the constituency
with interests and incentives closest to those of the corporation. By
maximizing their own wealth, the managing shareholders would
maximize corporate wealth. Because shareholders cannot manage the
corporation, the directors should manage for the shareholders’ benefit. In
doing so, the directors should SWM because that is what the shareholders
would have done. The argument contradicts itself by first recognizing that
shareholders incentives are imperfect because they differ from the
corporation’s and then instructing the directors to SWM rather than
corporate wealth maximize. The argument provides no basis for
privileging shareholder interests over corporate interests.
The agency argument. The argument is that directors are the
shareholders’ agents, so the directors should maximize the shareholders’
198

DRAFT RESTATEMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 26, at 25.
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wealth. But corporate law requires that directors, not shareholders,
manage the corporation and prohibits the directors from acting as the
shareholders’ agents.
The implied contract argument. The argument is that shareholders
and directors have impliedly agreed to SWM. In fact, the corporate
governance policies of a large majority of public corporations contain no
evidence of a SWM policy. In those corporations, no factual basis exists
for implying an agreement to SWM.
The shareholder monitoring argument. The argument is that directors
must SWM to enable shareholders to monitor the directors’ performance.
The argument asserts that shareholders monitor the directors by
observing the stock price and removing directors who perform poorly by
that measure. In fact, stock prices are poor indicators of director
performance and public corporation shareholders generally lack the
power to remove directors.
The failure of any of the SWM arguments to connect with the
corporation’s productive capacity shows that abandoning SWM will not
harm that capacity. Shareholders with their own money at stake are not
calling the shots in any of the argument scenarios.
Removing the remaining legal and normative pressures to SWM
would tend to reduce corporate externalization of social costs. It would
also eliminate corporate law’s hypocritical presumption that directors
calculate the long-term profitability of each of their decisions when
everyone knows they do not.
If Delaware clarified that SWM is optional, corporations like Home
Depot, Southern Company, Eastman Chemical Company, Wal-Mart, and
Caterpillar might continue to embrace it. 199 But SWM is so extreme a
policy that most corporations have been unwilling to SWM even when
SWM purports to be mandatory. Removing the fig leaf of law and norms
purporting to require SWM may be enough to finally end it. 200

Those five corporations were the only ones in Bebchuk and Tallarita’s 128-company data
set stating policies of SWM. Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 21, at 1055 (Eastman), 1060 (Home
Depot), 1070 (Caterpillar), 1073 (Walmart), and Southern Company, Corporate Governance
Guidelines, Oct. 21, 2019, at 6.
200 Bebchuk & Tallarita, supra note 21, at 1071 (quoting Caterpillar’s statement referring to
Caterpillar’s “obligations under Delaware General Corporation Law to maximize shareholder
value”).
199

